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We develop and test a simple model of limited attention in intertemporal choice. The model posits
that individuals fully attend to consumption in all periods but fail to attend to some future lumpy expenditure
opportunities. This asymmetry generates some predictions that overlap with models of present-bias.
Our model also generates the unique predictions that reminders may increase saving, and that reminders
will be more effective when they increase the salience of a specific expenditure. We find support for
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I. Introduction
Consumption, savings and borrowing behavior is sometimes dicult to reconcile with traditional
models of intertemporal choice. Calibrations of U.S. data suggest that extremely high short-term
discount rates are necessary to explain observed borrowing patterns (Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
2007). Voluntary commitment devices help increase savings (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006; Benartzi
and Thaler 2004). Default options have large eects on retirement savings decisions (Madrian and
Shea 2001; Beshears et al 2009). These patterns are often explained by models that emphasize time
inconsistency and self-control problems (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Fudenberg and
Levine 2006; Banerjee and Mullainathan 2009). In such models, people can exhibit both impatience
and patience, depending on the horizon or good of choice.
We develop some theory and evidence that a dierent psychology { limited attention { also plays
an important role in explaining these types of intertemporal choices. In most models, deciding what
to consume today requires a consideration of all future expenditure opportunities; e.g., how much
in school fees or taxes are coming due? What novel consumption opportunities will arise? In our
model, individuals overlook some of these future expenditure opportunities. We are motivated in
part by the \planning fallacy:" people systematically underestimate the time required to complete
tasks (Buehler, Grin and Ross 2002). But prodding people to list specic sub-components of
tasks improves the accuracy of time-completion estimates (Forsythe and Burt 2008). This evidence
illustrates the potential for overlooking specic items when making plans.
We provide a simple model of lifetime consumption and savings that incorporates an attentional
failure.1 Individuals face two kinds of consumption opportunities each period: 1) regular consumption
spending and 2) a lumpy expenditure, which occurs with certainty but can dier in each period. For
example, the expenditure opportunity may be school fees in one period, car registration in another
1Macroeconomists have proposed that costly information processing capability may lead to \rational inattention"
(Sims 1998 and 2003; Mankiw and Reis 2002; Ball, et al 2005; Reis 2006). In Gabaix and Laibson (2006) consumers
may not (fully) attend to future, state-contingent prices. In Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) agents are attentive only
to posted prices. These theoretical models have found empirical support; see DellaVigna (2009) for a review of the
eld evidence. While these models emphasize inattention to prices or some component of the price vector, our model
emphasizes inattention to future consumption opportunities. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) proposes a theoretical
model in which individuals allocate scarce attention between problems at home and problems at work, leading to a
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period, and a night out in the next. For simplicity, we assume that regular consumption spending has
no foresight problems but that lumpy expenditures are overlooked with some probability.2 In any
period individuals choose consumption to maximize their lifetime utility given the future expenditure
opportunities they \attend" to.3 The failure to forecast some future expenditure opportunities can
distort intertemporal allocations by leading to less smoothing (via more borrowing and/or less saving)
than would occur under perfect or unbiased foresight.
A simple example illustrates our model. Suppose you hear that your favorite singer is coming
to town three months from now. You decide to go, and mark the concert date in your calendar.
Tickets will not go on sale until the night of the show. Ideally, if your utility is concave with
respect to consumption, you would nance the ticket by smoothing the expenditure shock over your
lifetime { including some saving over the next three months. But if you are inattentive as in our
model, you may sometimes forget your concert plan and choose to consume instead of save. Then,
when the day of the concert arrives, you face the second-best options of forgoing the concert or
nancing it disproportionately through debt (e.g., by charging it to a credit card or incurring a
checking account overdraft fee) and thus reducing future consumption even more in order to cover
the nancing costs. This sort of attentional failure may or may not be consequential in isolation.
But lifetime consumption allocations are the result of countless such decisions, and small distortions
can add up (and compound). Now suppose there is a reminders technology (e.g., in your personal
digital assistant, or from a third-party as in Appendix Figure 1). Periodic reminder messages induce
you to attend to the benets and task of putting money aside for the concert, and thereby help you
increase incremental savings and long-run smoothing.
This example also highlights how our model relates to other ndings and behavioral models.
Savings deposit collection services may be eective because they serve as reminders (Ashraf, Karlan
and Yin 2006a; Dupas and Robinson 2009). Likewise, surveys may induce saving and investment
behaviors because they serve as reminders or as a shock to attention (Stango and Zinman 2010;
2This asymmetry is a stark way of creating a wedge between more vs. less routine consumption (e.g., daily food vs.
annual car registration fee).
3Our setup is related to Mullainathan (1999), where individuals fail to remember information that predicted future
income, and to Schwartzstein (2009), where individuals may mistakenly only attend to information that they consider
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Zwane et al 2010). Non-binding commitments may be eective because they operate on attention,
rather than on self-control with large transaction costs for undoing the commitment (e.g., default
options or automatic enrollment features in retirement saving; prepaid fertilizer sales as in Duo,
Kremer, and Robinson 2009). Indeed our model generates undersaving, and an ensuing inability to
take-up some high-return lumpy investments or high-utility lumpy expenditures, without any role for
(time-varying) impatience or commitment. Our model also suggests that overborrowing may occur
in part because debt can be \salience-advantaged" relative to saving; e.g., when debt is available
\on-demand," at the moment when a lumpy expenditure opportunity arises (unexpectedly, due to
limited attention) and is (momentarily) at the \top of mind."
Perhaps the starkest dierence between our model and other (behavioral) models is our key
role for reminders. Reminders change intertemporal allocations, and improve consumer welfare, by
providing associations between future expenditure opportunities and today's choices that mitigate
the attentional failure.4 Our model generates two related testable predictions: 1) Reminders will
increase saving; 2) Reminders will be particularly eective when they draw attention to a particular
future goal or opportunity; in this respect our model provides a novel potential microfoundation
for mental accounting (Thaler 1990). Instead of oering a weak counter to temptation, mental
labels provide a strong association between today's saving(s) and specic future events, increasing
the probability that individuals attend to those events when choosing consumption, and thereby
improving smoothing.
We test our model's predictions about reminders in eld experiments with three dierent banks
in Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines. In each experiment, individuals opened a bank savings ac-
count which included varying degrees of incentives or commitment features designed to encourage
individuals to reach a savings goal. Some individuals were randomly assigned to receive a monthly
4Our predictions on reminders have some similarities to cue-based models (Laibson 2001). But our setup is distinct
both motivationally and formally. Motivationally, work on cues has focused on the role of external stimuli in triggering
consumption desires, following a large body of psychological evidence on cravings and conditioning. We focus on
the role of external events {reminders { that focus attention on future expenditure opportunities, leading to savings.
Formally: 1) limited attention can lead to both ex-ante and ex-post mistakes in our model, whereas in preference-based
models individuals might consider consumption choices to be a mistake only ex-post; 2) neither past consumption nor
past reminders inuence current decisions in our model. In cue theory, the past matters because cues develop from
learned, Pavlovian associations between external stimuli and consumption.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 4
reminder via text message or letter, while a control group received no reminder. Reminders increased
the likelihood of reaching a savings goal by 3% and the total amount saved in the reminding bank by
6%. This eect size is comparable to that found for commitment savings on a similar sample in the
Philippines (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006a).5 Reminders that highlighted the client's particular goal
- i.e., reminders that made a particular future expenditure opportunity, like school fees, more salient
- were two times more eective than reminders that did not mention the goal. These ndings are
novel empirical evidence on the importance of reminders in household nance, and build on evidence
from several clinical trials on patient and clinician behaviors.6
Our theory, evidence, and applications have some limitations. We do not model awareness of or
competition for limited attention. We do not make specic predictions about what kind of events most
eectively increase attention. Indeed, we tested several other treatments that could be interpreted as
attention treatments that, unlike reminders, had no eect on saving. Our experimental results do not
cover the household's full balance sheet, and we cannot make precise statements about whether and
how much reminders increased total savings or changed consumer welfare in our sample. Our sample
is comprised of people who had already signed up to save of their own volition, thus we do not answer
the interesting question of whether attention treatments would dier for non-savers. Nevertheless
our theory and evidence provide novel evidence that limited attention may be an important driver of
intertemporal choice. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II details our main theoretical model
and predictions. Section III discusses some additional applications. Section IV details the settings
and design of our eld tests. Section V presents the results. Section VI concludes.
II. Model
We model individual consumption over a nite horizon period with 3  T < 1. In each period,
individuals receive constant income y. We assume for simplicity that individuals do not discount the
future so that the discount rate  = 1.
Individuals derive utility from consumption and from discrete (\lumpy") expenditure opportu-
5The commitment savings treatment in Ashraf et al (2006a) increased short-term savings balances by an average of
49 pesos (7%) relative to the control group treatment.
6See van Dulmen et al (2007) and Krishna et al (2009) for a review of evidence on the impact of reminders on
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nities. The utility from consumption spending is represented by the function u which is increasing
and concave in consumption. Individuals face one expenditure opportunity in every period. Lumpy
expenditure opportunities dier in terms of their composition in each time period (e.g., medical one
period, car registration the next), but always have a unit cost of 1. Individuals who pay a unit
cost to nance the opportunity faced in the current period receive additive utility  u. The decision
about whether to pay for the opportunity is represented by the binary variable xt, where xt = 1 if
individuals nance the expenditure opportunity and xt = 0 otherwise.
To maximize lifetime utility, individuals choose current period consumption ct and whether to
satisfy the expenditure opportunity xt.
T X
t=1
(u(ct) + xt u)
subject to:
wt+1 = wt + y   ct   xt for all t
w1 = 0 and wT+1 = 0
where wt represents the wealth at the start of a period. We assume that individuals start and end
with zero wealth. Individuals may save or borrow, and we assume that borrowed money must be
repaid by life's end. For simplicity, we assume that there is no interest charged on loans or earned
on savings.
Full Attention Benchmark
Fully \attentive" individuals correctly forecast all future expenditure opportunities from the rst
period, and, given concavity with respect to consumption, will optimize by smoothing: ct = c in
all periods. We can see by backward induction that the level of optimal consumption c will be a
function of the number of expenditures nanced.
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Let us denote kt =
T X
=t+1
x as the total number of future expenditures to be nanced after t. The
total number of expenditures satised will then be k1 + x1. In the rst period, individuals will
optimally chose to satisfy k
1 + x

















That is, individuals will nance expenditures until they are indierent between the utility from
nancing an additional expenditure and the marginal utility from consumption (assuming individuals
are not constrained by their lifetime income constraint k
1+x
1  Ty). Perfectly attentive individuals




T in each period. For fully
attentive individuals, consumption and savings plans will never deviate from the optimal plan made
in the rst period.
Without less of generality, we consider the notationally simple case of k
1+x
1 = T for the duration
of the analysis (i.e., fully attentive individuals will purchase one lumpy expenditure in every time
period in their lifetime). Wealth formation will therefore follow the process:
wt+1 = wt + y   c
t   x
t = wt +
T   1 + 1
T
  1 = wt
which implies s
t = 0. We could instead assume that fully attentive individuals optimally purchase
some fraction  2 [0;1] of expenditures, so that k
1 + x
1 = T. We could further specify that when





T = 1g. With these two assumptions, we would predict positive savings for
fully attentive individuals. Since borrowing and saving are symmetric in our model, we consider net
savings (amount saved less amount borrowed) when considering comparative statics between fully
attentive and inattentive consumers.
Inattention to Future Expenditures
In practice, individuals may not be fully attentive to all lumpy expenditure opportunities. Let us
consider that inattentive individuals attend perfectly to consumption and current period expenditureGetting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 7
opportunities, but only attend to future lumpy expenditure opportunities with some probability
 2 [0;1).
Inattentive individuals then choose their current period consumption ct and whether to satisfy
current period expenditure xt in order maximize their lifetime utility, as perceived in that time period
(i.e., considering only those lumpy expenditures they take into account in the current period).
u(ct) + xt u +
T X
=t+1
([u(c) + x u] + (1   )u(c))
subject to:
wt+1 = wt + y   ct   xt for all t
w0 = 0 and wT+1 = 0
We assume that individuals are unaware of their inattention to expenditures: people believe they are
optimizing utility as they would in the rational model, but they actually underforecast the number
of lumpy expenditure opportunities.
Inattentive individuals reoptimize their savings plan in every period depending on the realization
of e Kt which is a random variable representing the number of future expenditures an individual
attends to in period t. e Kt has expected value E( e Kt) = (T   t). Instead of saving the same xed
amount in each period, individuals will consider both their current period wealth and the set of
future expenditures they attend to when choosing consumption. Because individuals may forecast a
dierent number of future expenditures in every period, they must recalibrate their savings plan as
they are faced with unexpected expenditures. In doing this, individuals will either forgo some lumpy
expenditures (illustrated in example 1) or curtail consumption (illustrated in example 2), depending
on how much utility individuals get from each lumpy expenditure ( u).
As with fully attentive individuals, concave utility implies that inattentive individuals will plan to
smooth consumption so that e c
t = e c
 for all t;. By backward induction, we can see that consumptionGetting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 8
for the inattentive individual will be:
e ct = y +
"






=(T   t + 1)
Let us denote the number of future expenditures an individual plans to purchase in period t as:
e kt = 
T X
=t+1
e x. Individuals will choose whether to purchase the current expenditure (e x
t) and plan









e wt   (e k
t + e x
t)
T   t + 1
!
  u < u0
 
y +
e wt   (e k
t + e x
t + 1)
T   t + 1
!
Provided they are not constrained by their lifetime budget constraint in period t (e wt + e k
t t + e x
t 
[T  t+1]y), individuals will nance expenditures until they are indierent between the utility from
nancing an additional expenditure and the marginal utility from consumption.7 While the model
is agnostic about when expenditures will be nanced, we make the notationally simple assumption
that as long as individuals still gain positive marginal utility from nancing expenditures, they will
nance expenditures happening in the current period rst. That is, as long as e k
t + e x
t  1, e x
t = 1.8
Savings and Inattention




t + e x
t
T   t + 1
  e x
t
We can now compare expected savings for inattentive and attentive individuals. Individuals can
only plan to purchase weakly less than the future expenditures they foresee: e k
t  e KtRecall that in
our full attention benchmark, the consumer simply spends her income in each period, for a constant
7When individuals are budget constrained they will plan to nance fewer expenditures than k

t and the intuition of
our main result remains the same.
8This assumption is made for ease of notation and is without loss of generality.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 9
savings rate of zero. In contrast the inattentive consumer borrows in some period(s):
E(e s
t) =
E(e k) + x
t
T   t + 1
  x
t 
[(T   t) + 1]
T   t + 1
  1 < 0 = s
t (1)
So the inattentive consumer has a negative expected savings rate that is lower than the full-attention
consumer's.
Example
Let us consider an example in three periods, T = 3. Suppose that fully attentive individuals
prefer to nance 3 expenditures. That is, suppose that







Now let us suppose that an inattentive consumer fails to attend to just one lumpy expenditure
occurring in the future. Because she (incorrectly) forecasts only 2 total expenditures, she borrows
to nance part of the expenditure she faces in period 1. In period 2, when faced with an unplanned
expenditure, she realizes her mistake. The inattentive consumer then has two options: she can
either cut consumption to nance all 3 expenditures or she can forgo one expenditure. She will
nance an unexpected expenditure if and only if nancing the expenditure aords greater utility




















Otherwise, she will forgo the unexpected expenditure and maintain consumption.
Inattention in the rst period ultimately reduces lifetime utility, whether because of lower con-
sumption (as illustrated in Figure 1) or through purchasing fewer total lumpy expenditures (as
illustrated in Figure 2).
In models of self control, present biased preferences imply a relatively lower relative valuation
of future consumption. In our model, individuals fundamentally misunderstand the value of future
consumption. As with a model of self control, our model predicts that inattentive individuals will


































Figure 1: Model Example 1
control model which we will now discuss.
Reminders
In self-control models, individuals decide to consume more in the current period while fully
accounting for all future expenditures. That is, individuals who are present-biased plan to undersave
and or overborrow. Therefore, reminders should have no impact on the consumption decisions of
individuals with self control problems. On the other hand, if individuals have inconsistent savings and
consumption behavior because of lack of attention, we predict that reminders will increase savings.










































Figure 2: Model Example 2
lumpy expenditure opportunities: r > nr. In turn reminders aect the expected number of future
expenditure opportunities attended to in a current period:
Enr( e Kt) = nr(T   t)
Er( e Kt) = r(T   t)
with Er( e Kt) > Enr( e Kt). As before, individuals only plan to purchase lumpy expenditures they
foresee, and the optimal number of planned expenditures in future periods will be less than orGetting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 12
equal to the number of expenditures attended to: e k
t  e Kt. Therefore the expected number of
expenditures an individual plans to satisfy is higher in the presence of reminders: Er(e k
t) > Enr(e k
t).
From equation (1) we can then see that expected savings will be increasing in , and hence higher
after a reminder is introduced: Er(e s
t) > Enr(e s
t).
Note that models of temptation would only make this prediction under the additional assump-
tion that reminders aect preferences or the cost of self-control. Although this might be a natural
assumption to make for reminders or other exogenous, Pavlovian stimuli for current consumption
(Laibson 2001), there is little if any psychological or neurological evidence that such stimuli can
change the marginal utility of saving (or future consumption). We test our model using randomly
assigned reminders to save (see Section IV).
Mental Accounting
Our model also provides a potential microfoundation for mental accounting (Thaler 1990). Con-
sumers often report that they create separate accounts (real or imagined) for dierent spending
categories/goals and then constrain their spending based on individual account balances (rather
than total balances). This behavior violates the standard assumption of fungibility of money (see
DellaVigna 2009 for a review of related empirical evidence).
Our model helps explain why mental accounting might be a constrained optimum. For a limited
attention consumer, an account label increases the \salience" of a specic future lumpy expenditure
in the current period: i.e., the label may increase the likelihood of attending to the future expenditure
and optimally smoothing for it. The Appendix provides a formal model of salience and its eects
on attention. Less formally, dene 
r as the probability of attention when a reminder focuses on
a specic future expenditure occurring in period , so that 
r > r. Then the expected number
of lumpy expenditures will be higher when individuals receive a reminder that focuses on a specic
expenditure:
Er( e Kt) = r(T   t)
E
r( e Kt) = r(T   t   1) + 
rGetting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 13
Based on equation (1), we see that when individuals forecast more expenditures because of focusing
on a specic expenditure (Er( e Kt) > E





So our model predicts that savings rates will be higher when reminders mention (or are otherwise
associated with) a particular future expenditure. We test this prediction for a group of individuals
who placed a label on their saving account ex-ante, by randomizing whether a reminder to save
mentions the individual's chosen label. Please see Section V for the results.
Time Inconsistency
Models based on time-inconsistent preferences do not generally predict that reminders to save will
aect behavior. Yet empirically, measures of time-inconsistency are strongly correlated with more
discretionary borrowing (Meier and Sprenger 2009) and less saving (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006b).
We nd that reminders increase saving more for individuals who exhibit appear time-inconsistent
ex-ante. Here we oer a way to reconcile these ndings.
A common method for measuring time-inconsistency is to give individuals multiple hypothetical
choices between a smaller payo at time t and a larger payo at time t+1, where the choices vary t
(e.g., t might be \today" in one choice, and \six months from now" in another choice). When the
same individual prefers the smaller payo when t = today, but prefers the larger payo when t is
sometime in the future, we say that person is time-inconsistent.
But if individuals are credit constrained, such time-inconsistency may be borne of limited atten-
tion rather than preferences. To see this, consider a four-period example in our model. As in the
scenarios used to measure time-inconsistency, individuals face a choice between receiving A in period
1 and B in period 2, where A < B. In addition, individuals must choose between C in period 3
and D in period 4, where C < D. We modify our set-up by assuming that individuals are totally
credit constrained: they cannot borrow. Furthermore, individuals' current period income y is not
enough to nance a lumpy expenditure: y < 1. If the utility from the expenditure is high enough, a
consumer will prefer the smaller payo because it allows her to nance today's lumpy expenditure.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 14















Now consider a limited-attention consumer who does not forecast some future lumpy expenditure
opportunities. She considers the stream of consumption benets from the payos C and D but does
not consider the payos' implications for nancing unforeseen lumpy expenditure opportunities. To
simplify, consider the case where the consumer does not forecast any of the future lumpy expenditure
opportunities. Then if the consumption stream from the higher payo D is greater than the con-
sumption stream from the payo C, she prefers to wait for the higher payo. Formally, she prefers







< 3u(y) + u(y + D)




Our model also helps interpret the eects of default options on retirement plan enrollment, organ
donation and other decisions. Once enrolled, the default can \stick" in our model because the decision
(or, more precisely, the option of undoing the decision) leaves the top of mind. In contrast, models
with temptation requires time-varying costs of self-control to get sticky defaults.
Fertilizer Purchase
Evidence on fertilizer purchase and use from Duo, Kremer and Robinson (2009) suggests that
when visited by a program ocer at harvest time, farmers are more likely to buy fertilizer and use
this fertilizer at planting time, even when the fertilizer is delivered immediately after harvest and
could therefore be resold before planting time. These results are consistent with a model of time
inconsistency where there are costs to selling fertilizer.9 Choosing to have fertilizer delivered at
9These costs could be the costs of re-selling fertilizer or some stigma associated with selling fertilizer.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 15
harvest time could be seen as a form of commitment. However, these results are also consistent with
a model of limited attention. The event of the visit by the program ocer at harvest time is highly
associated with the future expenditure of purchasing fertilizer at the next planting period. Without
this event, farmers who have just nished planting would not be as likely to attend to all of the
expenditures they would face in the next planting cycle. Once the farmers have purchased fertilizer,
the fertilizer is perfectly associated with the need to use the fertilizer in planting periods, ensuring
that fertilizer is not crowded out by other consumption between harvest and planting time. The
fertilizer program allows farmers to prepare for future fertilizer expenditures without fully attending
to them when choosing current consumption.
Deposit Collection
Evidence from the Philippines and Kenya suggests that providing savers with deposit collection
services increases savings and investment (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006a; Dupas and Robinson 2009).
It could be that deposit collection services remove a small cost barrier to making deposits, allowing
individuals who might procrastinate to realize their intentions of saving more. However like defaults,
the \commitment" provided by deposit collection service is easy to reverse and therefore unlikely to
provide assistance to individuals who face serious self control programs. Instead, it could be that
deposit collection service brings savings to the top of mind on a regular basis, helping individuals
attend to future expenditure opportunities while making current consumption decisions.
Reminders of Other Forms
Zwane et al (2009) nd that taking a baseline survey on aspects of household nance and health
increases the subsequent takeup of health insurance products. Relatedly, Stango and Zinman (2010)
nd that taking a survey that mentions bank overdrafts decreases the subsequent likelihood of paying
an overdraft fee. This behavior could be consistent with limited attention consumers. If surveys focus
individual attention on future expenditure opportunities (health expenses and or fees), they could
increase individuals' willingness to invest in those opportunities in the current period.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 16
IV. Experimental Design
Here we describe the setting, design, and implementation for three eld experiments designed to test
two theoretical predictions 1) that reminders increase savings and 2) that reminders mentioning a
particular planned future expenditure will increase savings more than reminders that do not mention
the expenditure. Each design involves individuals responding to a marketing oer to open a goal-
oriented savings account. Linking back to the model, this implies that at the time of deciding whether
to open the account, the individual is thinking about the future expenditure, though he may forget
it in the future. In each experiment, after the account is opened, the bank then randomly assigned
clients to either receive a reminder or not. Each bank also had its personnel collect some \baseline"
data prior to making the product oer. In one of the sites (Philippines), the account includes a
commitment feature, i.e., the individual may not withdraw funds until a preset goal is reached. This
has potentially important implications for the sample frame, i.e., that only those who see value
in commitment to save open the accounts. For these products, the three banks each targeted the
working poor and lower middle class.
Experiment 1: First Valley Bank, Western Mindanao, Philippines
First Valley Bank (FVB), a for-prot bank operating in Western Mindanao, Philippines, worked
with us to randomize reminders as part of the rollout of its Gihandom (Dream) Savings product.10
Between April and August 2007, bank marketing employees conducted door-to-door marketing visits
in rural and small urban areas and oered 10,056 individuals the opportunity to open a Gihandom
account. As part of this marketing visit, the bank employee also conducted a brief ve to ten
minute survey. Bank sta used personal digital accessories (PDAs) for the baseline survey and
random assignment to treatments. Of the 10,056 individuals, 2,314 (23%) opened an account. The
reminders treatment was not part of the marketing of the account, and thus the analysis will be
conducted only on those who took-up.
10The bank also randomly assigned people to: a) a low interest rate, high interest rate, or low interest rate + 1.5%
reward for goal attainment; b) whether clients were given oers for an individual account only, a joint account only, or
the choice of individual or joint account. Requiring a joint account signicantly reduced take-up and lowered savings
(but the eect was not statistically signicant). Neither the high interest rate nor the reward interest rate had a
statistically meaningful impact on take-up or meeting savings goals. We control for these oers in our analysis of the
e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Gihandom allows a client to set her own savings goal amount (US$50 or above) and goal term
(from three months to two years). Once the client opens the account with a minimum deposit of
US$2.50, there is no xed deposit schedule to fulll. The client receives a savings lockbox and is
encouraged at sign-up to make small deposits on daily basis. When the lockbox is full, the client
goes to the bank to deposit the money. The rules of the account dier from the commitment savings
product described in Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006b) in that money in the account can be withdrawn
only if the account reaches the goal amount and the goal term has concluded.
Among clients with a cell phone (66% of those who opened accounts), the bank randomly as-
signed some clients to receive one \regular" text message reminder to make a deposit each month.
Among those assigned to get regular reminders, the bank also randomized whether the message used
gain or loss language with respect to \making your dream come true." The text of the reminder
messages are provided in Table 1a.11 Table 2 reports some validation checks on the integrity of the
randomizations.12
Clients were also randomly assigned to receive a \late" text message reminder or not, indepen-
dently of their assignment to receive a regular reminder. The late text reminder was only sent if the
client did not make any deposit in a given month. Similar to the regular text message reminders,
late text messages reminders were also randomized to gain or loss frame language. If the client was
assigned to receive both a regular text reminder and a late text reminder, then client always received
either gain frame for both, or loss frame for both. The text of the late reminders is included in Table
1a. Table 2 shows checks on the integrity of the randomization.13
Experiment 2: Bank of Ica, Ica, Peru
In Peru, the Government owned bank Caja de Ica worked with us to randomize reminders as
part of the rollout of a new commitment savings product called Plan Ahorro (\Saving Plan"). The
11A fourth group was randomly assigned to deposit collection service. The deposit collection was not widely used,
and thus the bank stopped providing the service. We include controls for individuals who were originally assigned to
receive deposit collection.
12In the Philippines, we have income data based on individual reports about their income in the past seven days. A
wealth index was constructed from a range of survey variables including income, whether the individual owns a home,
water source, roof, and whether they have a shared pipe for water.
13The wealth variable in Peru is constructed using the IRIS poverty score card in Peru, where where \wealthy" =
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bank marketed the product on television and radio, and clients signed up over the course of several
months. When opening an account, Plan Ahorro clients selected a commitment period (either 6
months or 12 months), a minimum amount to deposit each month, and a goal/account label from 14
pre-established categories (these savings goals appear in Appendix Table 1). Clients were required
to make their planned deposit within ten days of each monthly due date in order to meet their
commitment. Clients who completed their commitment were rewarded with an annualized interest
rate of 8% per annum rather than the normal 4% per annum.
As in our other sites, the bank randomly assigned reminders to clients after they signed up for the
product. The bank sent letters because low cell phone prevalence made text messages impractical.
As in the Philippines, the bank did independent randomizations for \regular" and \late" reminders,
which were jointly to a gain or a loss frame.14 Table 1b shows the text of the dierent reminder
letters.
Each month, the bank sent clients assigned to the regular reminder group a letter seven days
before the due date for that month's scheduled deposit. As in the Philippines, clients assigned to
the late reminder group got a letter only if they were late (i.e., if they still had not made a deposit
three days after their scheduled deposit date).15
The bank implemented two additional treatments designed to increase the salience of the client's
specic, labeled goal. One treatment randomly assigned some in the reminder group to get a letter
that focused on their particular goal (in addition to containing the boilerplate reminder content, see
Table 1b). Another treatment independently and randomly assigned the gift clients received upon
opening the account: a jigsaw puzzle of their goal, a photo of their goal, or a pen. Those in the
jigsaw puzzle group received a piece of the puzzle after each deposit.
14The bank also randomly assigned clients to receive a message on each month's deposit slip (gain frame vs loss
frame; a mention of goal versus no mention of goal, or control). The bank also assigned some individuals to receive a
reminder message written by the bank and another group to receive a reminder message written in an individual's own
hand. These treatments did not impact the amount that individuals saved.
15Clients assigned to receive late reminders were randomly assigned to receive their late reminder if (a) they were
late for any scheduled deposit, (b) they were late for any of the rst four scheduled deposits, and c) they were late
for any of the fth or later scheduled deposits.These timing treatments had imprecisely estimated and statistically
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Experiment 3: Ecofuturo Bank, Bolivia
In Bolivia, Ecofuturo, a for-prot bank, worked with us to implement a text message reminder
program as part of its established, popular commitment savings product Ecoaguinaldo. \Aguinaldo"
is the year-end bonus, equal to one month's pay, that employers are required to pay employees in
Bolivia. Ecofuturo markets Ecoaguinaldo as a product designed to help its clients, many of whom
are self-employed, save up all year for their own year-end payout. The product was marketed for
three months between January and March on television and radio. Clients were required to sign up
for the product by March 31, and made savings deposits from the time of their enrollment until the
December payout date.
At sign-up, clients chose a monthly minimum deposit amount (with a oor of US$1.41), and the
bank oered a set of incentives for making the pledged, minimum monthly deposits. Clients making
all of their pledged monthly deposits received a bonus interest rate of 6% for their rst ten months
following enrollment in the program (compared to a regular interest rate of 3%) as well as free life
and accident insurance.16 Clients missing one deposit, or withdrawing money before the payout date,
forfeited the higher interest rate and had their insurance policies canceled.
Clients with a cell phone were randomly assigned to receive text message reminders or not.17
Unlike the other sites, clients did not receive late reminders. The bank began sending reminders to a
randomly selected subset of the reminder group in May 2008, and continued with the entire sample
from June 2008 through November 2008. In the rst two months of the program following May 2008
all of the reminder clients received text message reminders, regardless of whether they had already
made a deposit. In the remaining four months of the program, only clients who had not yet made a
deposit received a text message reminder.18
Clients in the treatment group were further divided into one of four reminder content sub-
treatments. Some messages mentioned the insurance incentive, while others did not. Reminders
16Ecofuturo paid the monthly premiums of $0.13 and $0.32 on policies that paid $214 in the event of death and $285
in the event of debilitating injury.
17Some individuals had multiple accounts. Our analysis focuses on the total saved in all accounts. We include
controls for the number of accounts that individuals have.
18In our analysis, these clients are still considered to be in the text message treatment group since they received
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were also randomized to gain or loss frames. Table 1c shows the dierent scripts of the reminders.
V. Results
Overall Effect of Reminders on Saving
One of the two key testable predictions of our model is that reminders will increase savings. Our
primary, and simplest, test of this prediction is to use data from all three experiments to identify
the eect of getting any reminder.
Yi =  + Ri + Zi + "i (2)
We measure Y, savings by client i, two dierent ways: the log of (1+the total amount saved in the
bank account by the end of the commitment period),19 or an indicator for whether the client saved
her targeted amount by the end of commitment period. R is an indicator that equals 1 if the bank
randomly assigned the client to receive any reminder. Z is a vector of randomization conditions,
other treatment assignments, and country xed eects. We also provide specications that show
robustness to including X, a vector of the client's baseline characteristics. We report OLS estimates
in the main tables; the results are robust to using probit for the binary measure of saving (see
Appendix Tables 2a and 2b).
Table 3 Panel A presents estimates of equation (2). Clients who received monthly reminders
saved 6% more than individuals who did not, with a p-value of 0.079 or 0.065, depending on whether
we include client baseline covariates (Columns 1 and 2). Reminders also made clients 3 percentage
points more likely to save their targeted amount (\reach savings goal" below) by the end of the
commitment period. Table 3 Panel B presents results separately for each experiment. We do not
nd any evidence that reminders have signicantly dierent eects across settings, although these
estimates are a bit imprecise: the condence intervals do not rule out economically meaningful
dierences across the three settings.
The Salience of Specific Expenditures
Our model also predicts that reminders which are highly associated with a particular future
192,592 clients had made no deposits by the end of the study.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 21
lumpy expenditure will increase savings. We can test this prediction in Peru, our only setting where
clients labeled their savings account with a specic future expenditure.
Table 4 Panel A shows support for this prediction. Reminders that mentioned the specic ex-
penditure increased savings by an estimated 16% relative to no reminder, while reminders that did
not mention the specic expenditure had no eect (Column 1). The dierence between these two
reminder coecients is signicant. In contrast, we do not nd signicant eects, or a signicant
dierence between the eects, of the two types of reminders on goal attainment (Column 2).
Salience, Mental Accounting, and Timing
Table 4 Panel B sheds some further light on the relationship between mental accounting (in the
form of the specic expenditure clients use to label their accounts in Peru), limited attention, and the
timing of shocks to attention. Recall that, in addition to reminders, the bank in Peru also randomly
and independently assigned clients to a second treatment that was designed to increase the salience
of the client's specic future expenditure.Clients in the control group received a pen from the bank,
at account opening. Clients in the treatment group were randomly received either a photograph of
the future expenditure they used to label the account, or a piece of a jigsaw puzzle depicting the
future expenditure (an example of a photograph a goal is included in Appendix Figure 2).20 Neither
of these treatments signicantly aected savings. Furthermore, these treatments were signicantly
less likely to increase savings than the expenditure specic reminders.21
Note that the timing of these treatments diers from the reminders. Clients got photos at account
opening. Clients got a puzzle piece after making a deposit. Clients got reminders before making a
deposit.
The nature of the treatments diers as well. The photo and puzzles reinforce the client's goal
(the specic expenditure), but not a means toward achieving a goal (making the next deposit).
The reminders are focused on the means (making a deposit), and the most eective reminders also
20Most pictures were self explanatory. When individuals were saving for an \emergency," the picture of their goal
was a hospital emergency room. For individuals saving for the goal \other," the picture of their goal was the logo of
the \Plan Ahorro" savings account.
21The comparison of expenditure specic reminder to puzzle has F-statistic = 8:10 and the comparison of the
expenditure specic reminder and photo treatment has F-statistic = 10:27.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 22
mention the goal.
The results here suggest that both the timing and content can impact the eectiveness of shocks
to attention. We discuss some implications for further research in the conclusion.
Alternative Explanations
Perhaps reminders impact saving because they are a signal from the bank that saving is important,
or that the bank values the client's relationship? The regular communication in the form of a
reminder may also have increased clients' trust of the bank. These alternatives to limited attention
could explain the main eect of reminders, but not the dierential impact of reminders that mention
the client's goal. Nor do these alternatives explain why (well-timed) reminders are more eective
than gifts like the photo, puzzle, or pen (although naturally these alternative treatments may simply
have been ineective, i.e., they did not successfully act as a signal or generate higher levels of trust).
Another explanation for the eectiveness of reminders would be a two part argument: individuals
are not merely hyperbolic or consistent as is traditionally modeled (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue
and Rabin 1999), but stochastically hyperbolic, and that reminders lower the probability of being
hyperbolic in a given time period. The mechanism is not so dierent from our model here, in
that the reminder \works" by focusing attention on the future, in the case of attention by simply
incorporating the future expenditure into the current consumption and savings decision, and in
the case of hyperbolic preference by changing the discount rate which drives the choice between
consumption and savings.
Heterogeneity in the Effectiveness of Reminders
As shown in Section II, our model also predicts that reminders will be especially eective on
individuals who appear time-inconsistent, if time-inconsistency is due to the interaction of limited
attention and liquidity constraints rather than time preferences that are present-biased. Our entire
sample is plausibly credit constrained, so we test this prediction by simply estimating the interaction
between reminders and a measure of time-inconsistency obtained in the Philippines baseline survey.
Table 2 shows that 16% of the Philippines sample made time-inconsistent choices when presented
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(~=$6 USD) guaranteed in 1 month?" and \Would you prefer to receive P200 guaranteed in 6 months,
or P300 guaranteed in 7 months?"
Table 5 shows some support for the prediction that reminders will be more eective on time-
inconsistent individuals. This holds for savings balances (a 47% increase, with a p-value of 0.07),
and we also nd a large and positive point estimate on savings goal attainment (7 percentage points,
or 35%), although that treatment eect is not signicantly dierent from zero.
Other Account features
Appendix Table 3 presents results from other treatments with weaker links to the theory. Panel
A shows that reminders in Bolivia increased savings when they mentioned the account's nancial
incentive (along with the \year-end payout" used to frame the account). Reminders that do not
include this nancial incentive do not signicantly impact savings. We do not nd strong evidence of
dierential eects of loss vs. gain-framed reminder messages (Panel B), of late vs. regular reminders
(Panel C), or of client-written vs. bank-written reminders (Panel D).
Cost Effectiveness of Reminders
The variable cost of sending direct mail reminders is nontrivial (almost a dollar in the Peru
context). Given our estimated treatment eect (a 6% increase in bank balances) and the small
average balances ($100 or less), mailing reminders is not cost-eective for banks under reasonable
assumptions about rates of return on deposited funds. Indeed the one bank here that experimented
with mailing reminders discontinued them after the study. However, sending reminders by text
message has near zero marginal cost. And indeed Ecofuturo in Bolivia has continued sending the
reminders. Direct mail costs and the recent emergence of low-cost text messaging may help explain
why most banks have not (yet) oered reminders to save.
VI. Conclusion
We develop and test a model of savings and consumption behavior when individuals have limited
attention. Our model predicts that individuals will undersave when they are inattentive to some
future expenditures. The model generates several phenomena that overlap with other behavioral
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model also makes the unique predictions that reminders to save will increase savings, that reminders
mentioning a particular future expenditure will be especially eective, and that reminders will be
especially eective on time-inconsistent individuals (given, as we show, that time-inconsistency can
be driven by limited attention and credit constraints rather time preference reversals per se). We
nd support for these predictions in eld experiments with three banks in the Philippines. These
ndings raise several issues for further research.
One key question going forward is the relationship between present-biased attention and present-
biased preferences. Are both biases prevalent, and correlated with each other? Or does one dominate
decision making (in certain domains)? Our results open up the possibility that phenomena attributed
to unstable time preference may in fact be due to limited attention, but more work is needed to
address this possibility rigorously.
A closely related issue is measuring a broader set of outcomes that might be aected by \treat-
ments" for limited attention. If limited attention takes particular forms, or if consumers have ad-
ditional behavioral biases, then attention-getting treatments could have countervailing and even
perverse eects. Reminders from one bank may crowd-out savings in other instruments, or even
induce (expensive) borrowing to oset lost consumption, thereby reducing savings on net.
Understanding the market for attention is critical. For example, only one of the banks that
implemented reminders in this study has continued reminding its clients to save. Might the market
under-supply reminders, particularly if consumers are naive about their limited attention? Do lenders
exploit attentional failures by providing nancing \on-demand," that is tied to specic expenditures
(as is common in durables nancing), and comes with built-in reminders (e.g., required monthly
payments)?
Deriving the optimal content and timing of attention treatments also oers rich possibilities for
future work. Our results hint that reminders are most eective when they focus on both a particular
future goal set by the client (e.g., a future expenditure to be purchased with a targeted savings
amount), and on the means toward achieving that goal (making the next deposit). But our results
suggests that the relationships between ends, means, and attention are complex; e.g., in the one siteGetting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 25
where the bank (and not the client) labeled the account with a homogeneous goal{ the year-end
payout in Bolivia{ reminders were only eective when they mentioned nancial incentives for goal
attainment.
We also speculate that the frequency and source of attention shocks plays an important role.
Attention may interact with habit formation; e.g., if reminders to save induce consumers to adopt
pro-savings routines. Conversely, some consumers may eventually \tune out" repeated reminders.
These dynamics suggest that reminders or other attention shocks may be most (cost-)eective
when they focus on inducing a one-time change with \sticky" consequences (e.g., 401k enrollment,
fertilizer prepayment, or automatic payment of annual car registration fees). Ultimately, the welfare
implications of limited attention presumably depend not only on how a consumer responds to a given
attention shock, but on how shocks are generated (endogenously) and interact. It should be fruitful
to build bridges between models like ours, and models where rms (and other agents) compete for
consumer attention.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 26
Appendix
Formal Definition of Salience
The probability that individuals attend to future expenditures may depend on events that occur
in the current period. For example, a reminder to save for school fees in each period will make people
more likely to attend to the opportunity to pay for school fees when they occur. Other events may
have a weaker association with future opportunities. For example, the event of meeting the parents
of your daughter's ance may or may not be associated with the future opportunity of nancing your
daughter's wedding.





Events occurring in period t have some association with opportunities that occur in the future
(periods  > t). The strength of the association between an event in the current period t and an
opportunity in a future period  is denoted by the parameter ak  0. The probability of attention
in period t an opportunity that will occur in period  is
t





where m represents a baseline probability of attention to future opportunities and events associated
with future opportunities increase the probability of attending to future opportunities. F represents
a cumulative density function such that 0 <= F(x) < 1 and F is increasing in x. We can use this
framework of events and associations to consider a more formal denition of salience.22
The salience of a future expenditure in the current period is the average association of all current
events with that future opportunity. The salience of an event occurring in  to an individual in
22In our model, events occurring in the present can increase the salience of future expenditure opportunities in a
way that is related to the ability of current events to increase recall of the past as proposed by Mullainathan's (1998)
model of memory.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 27










Individuals are more likely to attend to future opportunities that are highly associated with current
events or that are associated with many events in the present. In turn, individuals are more likely
to attend to opportunities in the future that have high salience today. That is because increasing
the salience of a future opportunity in the current period will increase the probability of attention
to that opportunity today. Since the average number of expenditures an individual attends to when
planning for the future increases in  (as can be seen in equation (1)), expected savings will increase
as the salience of future opportunities increases.Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 28
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Table 1a: Message Treatments 
Philippines 
Timing Frame  Message 
Regular 
Gain 
Frequent deposit into the Gihandom Savings account will 
make your dream come true. A reminder from 1st Valley 
Bank. 
Loss 
If you don't frequently deposit into the Gihandom Savings 




You didn't deposit in the 1st Valley Gihandom account for 
30 days. Don't forget to deposit, so you can reach your 
savings goal, make your dream come true! 
Loss 
You didn't deposit in the 1st Valley Gihandom account for 
30 days. If you forget to deposit, you cannot reach your 
savings goal and make your dream come true. 
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Table 1b: Message Treatments 
Peru 
Timing Message  Focus  Frame  Message 
Regular 
We would like to 
remind you that your 
next Plan Ahorro 
deposit should be 




Regular + If you make all of 
your deposits, you will receive a 
total of [Amount] in additional 
interest rate incentive! 
Loss 
Regular + If you miss a 
payment, you will lose a total of 






Regular + If you make all of 
your deposits, you will receive a 
total of [Amount] in additional 
interest rate incentive that you 
will be able to use to reach your 
savings goal of [Goal]! 
Loss 
Regular + If you miss a 
payment, you will lose a total of 
[Amount] in additional interest 
rate incentive that you will be 
able to use to reach your savings 
goal of [Goal]! 
Late 
We would like to 
remind you that your 
Plan Ahorro deposit 
should have be made 
on [Date].  If you wish 
to continue in Plan 
Ahorro you should 
make your deposit as 




Late + If you make all of your 
deposits, you will receive a total 
of [Amount] in additional 
interest rate incentive! 
Loss 
Late + If you miss a payment, 
you will lose a total of [Amount] 






Late + If you make all of your 
deposits, you will receive a total 
of [Amount] in additional 
interest rate incentive that you 
will be able to use to reach your 
savings goal of [Goal]! 
Loss 
Late + If you miss a payment, 
you will lose a total of [Amount] 
in additional interest rate 
incentive that you will be able to 
use to reach your savings goal of 
[Goal]! 
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Table 1c: Message Treatments 
Bolivia 
Focus Frame  Message 
Incentive Reminder 
Gain 
Ecofuturo reminds you: Maintain your Ecoaguinaldo life 
insurance! Don’t forget your deposit this month! You will 
keep your insurance by making all of your deposits on time. 
Loss 
Ecofuturo reminds you: Don’t lose your Ecoaguinaldo life 
insurance! Don’t forget your deposit this month! You will 




Ecofuturo reminds you: Your Ecoaguinaldo is within reach! 
Don’t forget your deposit this month! You will be one step 
closer to your savings goal. 
Loss 
Ecofuturo reminds you: Don’t fail to reach your 
Ecoaguinaldo! Don’t forget you deposit this month! If you 
don’t make your deposit you increase the chance of not 
reaching your savings goal. 
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Panel A: Specific Expenditure Focused
Standard Reminder -0.007 -0.008 0.028 0.027
(0.059) (0.059) (0.027) (0.027)
Specific Expenditure Focused Reminder 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.024 0.024
(0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020)
Baseline Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.076 4.076 0.679 0.679
N 2968 2968 2968 2968
Panel B: Effect of Puzzle intervention and Photo Intervention
Puzzle of Goal -0.018 -0.013 0.021 0.019
(0.042) (0.042) (0.021) (0.021)
Photo of Goal -0.043 -0.040 0.003 0.001
(0.046) (0.046) (0.022) (0.022)
Baseline Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.076 4.076 0.679 0.679
N 2968 2968 2968 2968
Log (Amount saved by Goal Date+1) Reached Savings Goal By Goal Date
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Reminder messages sent by text message in Bolivia and Philippines. Reminder 
message sent by mail in Peru.  All regressions include controls for marketing offers in the Philippines (interest rate, joint/single account, deposit collection), 
number of accounts per individual (Bolivia), and country fixed effects.  Omitted variable in Panel A is "no reminder."  Omitted variable in Panel B is receiving a 
pen.
Table 4: Focus on Specific Expenditures (Peru Sample Only)
Panel A:  Time Inconsistency
Any Reminder Message 0.151 0.087 0.180* 0.106 0.013 0.004 0.018 0.006
(0.104) (0.113) (0.106) (0.115) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Time Inconsistent -0.380* -0.341 -0.070 -0.061
(0.226) (0.234) (0.060) (0.064)
Interaction: Any Reminder * Time Inconsistent 0.472* 0.548** 0.070 0.087
(0.259) (0.265) (0.067) (0.071)
Baseline Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.531 2.531 2.531 2.531 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204
N 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547
Log (Amount saved by Goal Date+1) Reached Savings Goal By Goal Date
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Reminder messages sent by text message.  Regressions include controls for marketing offers in 
the Philippines (interest rate, joint/single account, deposit collection).  Omitted variable is "no reminder."
Table 5: Time Inconsistency (Philippines Sample Only)